Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange
The Quarterly Journal of EconomicsPublished 1 November 1982
George A. Akerlof
Citations3,200
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score35.99
SNIP9.32
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Abstract
This paper explains involuntary unemployment in terms of the response of firms to workers' group behavior. Workers' effort depends upon the norms determining a fair day's work. In order to affect those norms, firms may pay more than the market-clearing wage. Industries that pay consistently more than the market-clearing wage are primary, and those that pay only the market-clearing wage are secondary. Thus, this paper also gives a theory for division of labor markets between primary and secondary.
Keywords
Social SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis
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