On Moral Hazard and Insurance
The Quarterly Journal of EconomicsPublished 1 November 1979
Steven Shavell
Citations676
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score35.99
SNIP9.32
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TL;DR
This paper focuses on the part of moral hazard when care is not observed by the insurer and the role of the insurer in this situation.
Abstract
I. Introduction, 541.—II. The model, 542.—III. Moral hazard when care is not observed by the insurer, 544.—IV. Moral hazard when care is observed by the insurer, 550.—Appendix, 561.
Keywords
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