Incorporating the Rules Committee: An Extension of the Ferejohn/Shipan Model

Abstract

This article uses a spatial modeling approach to examine congressional over- sight of bureaucratic agencies. The model used here builds on work by John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan. By modifying one of their assumptions and adding a Rules Committee to the model, I find equilibria that differ signifi- cantly from that of the Ferejohn/Shipan model. I find that the existence of an autonomous Rules Committee keeps agency policies from deviating much from the preferences of the House's median member. Somewhat surprisingly, I find that policy outcomes move closer to the House median member's ideal point as the ideal point of the Rules Committee moves away from the House. and the courts on policy-making by administrative agencies. The Fere- john/Shipan model produces significant insights into the effects of institution- al structures on policy outcomes. In this article I suggest that modifying one of the key assumptions of Ferejohn and Shipan's model produces a deeper understanding of congressional influence on the bureaucracy. The model developed by Ferejohn and Shipan assumes that each player's actions are constrained by the anticipated future actions of the other players. All actors are assumed to know the preferences of the other actors, the formal powers of the other players, and the institutional structure that determines the sequence of moves in the game. This approach allows Ferejohn and Shipan to investigate the effects of the institutionalized decision-making process on the relationship between the actors' preferences and the policy outcomes. In the model developed below, I retain these assumptions to analyze the effects of adding another actor to the Ferejohn/Shipan model. Ferejohn and Shipan assert that a model proposed by Weingast and Moran (1983) errs by assuming that Congress considers legislation under a closed rule. They argue that Congress cannot commit itself in advance to adopt any specific type of rule; therefore, the closed-rule assumption is inappropriate. A