A spatial analysis of winning and losing motions in the U.S.

Abstract

In legislative settings, sponsors of policy alternatives confront a dilemma: policy alternatives that they most prefer may not attract enough support to win. Instead, sponsors may have to compromise their preferred positions if they hope to see some version of their desired policy enacted into law. This dilemma is well recognized in U.S. Congress by those who spend their days advocating and making policy. Indeed, a common assumption is that dilemma is pervasive throughout Congressional process. Sponsors are generally assumed to confront dilemma whenever they seek to formulate winning alternatives. Congressional politics is often defined as the art of compromise; and politicians often draw distinction between principle and expediency. Despite familiarity of dilemma, there has been little systematic investigation of how often sponsors actually confront it and how they resolve it. In particular, three sets of related questions remain largely unexamined. They are: