Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law
The RAND Journal of EconomicsPublished 1 January 1990
Suzanne Scotchmer, Jerry Green
Citations437
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score4.17
SNIP2.43
Generate an AI Snapshot to get a quick, structured summary of this paper.
Study Snapshot
ObjectiveStudy objective
MethodsResearch methodology
PopulationPopulation studied
Sample sizeSample sizes
OutcomesStudy outcomes here
ResultsStudy results comes here
LimitationsResearch study limitations comes here
A concise AI-generated summary of the paper will appear here once you click Generate AI Snapshot.
Abstract
The stringency of the novelty requirement in patent law affects the pace of innovation because it affects the amount of technical information that is disclosed among firms. It also affects ex ante profitability of research. We compare weak and strong novelty requirements from the standpoint of social efficiency. We ask how our answer depends on the rule that determines which firm gets a patent when two firms have patents pending on the same technology. The possible rules are first-to-invent, which applies in the U.S., and first-to-file, which applies everywhere else.
Keywords
Economics, Econometrics and FinanceBusiness, Management and Accounting
The Journal of Economic PerspectivesStanding on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law
1,334 Citations1991Suzanne Scotchmer
The RAND Journal of EconomicsOptimal Patent Length and Breadth
857 Citations1990Richard J. Gilbert, Carl Shapiro
Conditions under which the optimal patent policy involves infinitely-lived patents, with patent breadth adjusting to provide the required reward for innovation are provided.
The RAND Journal of EconomicsHow Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?
679 Citations1990Paul Klemperer
