Subjectivity and Memory

Abstract

This chapter discusses whether the kind of pervasive background coloration that seems to characterize moods and other affective states has any functional role in cognition and, if so, whether such roles can be studied empirically. First, it seems somewhat surprising that the question has not received more attention. Bartlett placed vague, largely affective, general impressions of the whole of a past event (which he called attitudes) at the center of his theory of reconstructive memory. This aspect of his theory is virtually the one that has not led to further research in the past ten years. Four common beliefs can be offered as reasons for this neglect. First, internal experience is private. Second, to the extent that feelings function as background gestalts, they could not be modeled even if they were not private. The third and fourth reasons are that background feelings and moods are not causal agents in cognitive activity (i.e., they are epiphenomenal) and, in any case, questions concerning them cannot be empirical. It is these two assumptions that are disagreeable. First, even if feelings do have epiphenomenal origins, once had they could then become useful. Second, if some hypothesized aspect of mental functioning cannot be modeled, it can still be tested indirectly by designing experiments that may preclude alternative accounts to those invoking the proposed construct. This chapter outlines some ways in which phenomena related to mental states may be involved in the representation and recall of text and real events.