The Framing of Decisions and the Rationality of Choice.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich)Published 1 April 1980
Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman
Citations322
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Abstract
The psychological principles that govern individual decision making produce predictable reversals of preferences when the same decision problem is framed in different ways. Inconsistencies are illustrated in choices involving monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in policy questions that pertain to the loss of human lives. Our analysis questions the descriptive adequacy of the standard rational model and highlights the dependence of the normative theory of choice on the psychology of hedonic experience. (Author)
Keywords
Decision Sciences