Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements
The Review of International OrganizationsPublished 31 October 2006Open access
Carlo Carraro, Johan Eyckmans, Michael Finus
Citations193
SJR quartileQ4
SJR score0.11
SNIP0.06
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Abstract
10.1007/s11558-006-0162-5
Keywords
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
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