Coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer–retailer channel

This paper addresses channel coordination by seeking optimal cooperative advertising strategies and equilibrium pricing in a two-member distribution channel and identifies the feasible solutions to a bargaining problem where the channel members can determine how to divide the extra profits.

Abstract

Cooperative advertising is a practice that a manufacturer pays retailers a portion of the local advertising cost in order to induce sales. Cooperative advertising plays a significant role in marketing programs of channel members. Nevertheless, most studies to date on cooperative advertising have assumed that the market demand is only influenced by advertising expenditures but not by retail price. This paper addresses channel coordination by seeking optimal cooperative advertising strategies and equilibrium pricing in a two-member distribution channel. We establish and compare two models: a non-cooperative, leader–follower game and a cooperative game. We develop propositions and insights from the comparison of these models. The cooperative model achieves better coordination by generating higher channel-wide profits than the non-cooperative model with these features: (a) the retailer price is lower to consumers; and (b) the advertising efforts are higher for all channel members. We identify the feasible solutions to a bargaining problem where the channel members can determine how to divide the extra profits.