The Effects of Integration on R&D Incentives in Systems Markets
NETNOMICS Economic Research and Electronic NetworkingPublished 1 May 2003
Jay Pil Choi, Gwanghoon Lee, Christodoulos Stefanadis
Citations15
SJR quartileQ3
SJR score0.36
SNIP0.60
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Abstract
Abstract We consider a systems market where two complementary components must be used in combination to provide valuable services. The market for the first component is monopolized whereas the market for the second is potentially served by multiple firms. We show that integration of the monopolist into the competitive complementary market may distort incentives for R&D, reducing total economic welfare.
Keywords
Economics, Econometrics and FinanceBusiness, Management and AccountingEngineering
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