A Structural Equation Model for Tax Compliance and Auditing
National Bureau of Economic ResearchPublished 1 April 1988Open access
Kurt J. Beron, Helen Tauchen, Ann Dryden Witte
Citations17
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Abstract
In this paper, we estieate a three equation sodel for taxpayers' reported incoce and tax liability and for the probability of an audit. Our work differs f roe previous studies in that our dependent variables in the coepliance equations are taxpayer reports rather than a variable related to auditor estisates of noncoepliance and in that we esticate a structural equation for audits.
Keywords
Economics, Econometrics and FinanceBusiness, Management and Accounting
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