Refining cheap-talk equilibria
Journal of Economic TheoryPublished 1 December 1991
Steven A. Matthews, Masahiro Okuno‐Fujiwara, Andrew Postlewaite
Citations132
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score3.44
SNIP1.19
Generate an AI Snapshot to get a quick, structured summary of this paper.
Study Snapshot
ObjectiveStudy objective
MethodsResearch methodology
PopulationPopulation studied
Sample sizeSample sizes
OutcomesStudy outcomes here
ResultsStudy results comes here
LimitationsResearch study limitations comes here
A concise AI-generated summary of the paper will appear here once you click Generate AI Snapshot.
Abstract
Several conceptual points are made concerning communication in games of asymmetric information. Equilibrium refinements of Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games that are based on the concept of a putative equilibrium, and which rely on the presence of a rich language with literal meanings, are discussed. Three nested criteria are proposed: strong announcement-proofness, announcement-proofness, and weak announcement-proofness.
Keywords
Decision SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and FinancePhysics and Astronomy
The Quarterly Journal of EconomicsSignaling Games and Stable Equilibria
3,333 Citations1987In‐Koo Cho, David M. Kreps
EconometricaOn the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
1,413 Citations1986Elon Kohlberg, Jean‐François Mertens
Games and Economic BehaviorMeaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games
518 Citations1993Joseph Farrell
Journal of Economic TheoryPerfect sequential equilibrium
392 Citations1986Sanford J. Grossman, Motty Perry
The Quarterly Journal of EconomicsVeto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
215 Citations1989Steven A. Matthews
American Economic ReviewCheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcments
195 Citations1989Jeremy C. Stein
UCL Discovery (University College London)Modeling rational players I
193 Citations1987Ken Binmore
This paper focuses on the non-cooperative analysis of games with some dynamic structure in which the choice of one move or another during the play of the game may convey valuable information to the other players.
Journal of Economic TheoryCommunication between rational agents
174 Citations1990Matthew Rabin
A solution concept which does guarantee communication in some games is defined, and an equilibrium version of the concept is defined and proved, and examples where its predictions seem more natural than Farrell's neologism-proof equilibrium are presented.
RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsCheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements.
142 CitationsStein, Jeremy C
Cambridge University Press eBooksMathematical models in economics
110 Citations1996Martin Anthony, Norman Biggs
The Quarterly Journal of EconomicsEquilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
100 Citations1990Françoise Forges
Journal of Economic TheoryCredible negotiation statements and coherent plans
73 Citations1989Roger B. Myerson
Criteria are developed to determine which negotiation statements are credible with respect to a reference payoff allocation for the negotiator's possible types, including mechanism design by an informed principal.
Journal of Economic TheoryEffective cheap talk with conflicting interests
59 Citations1990Daniel J. Seidmann
Cheap talk may influence a receiver's equilibrium actions even if all of the sender's types share a common preference ordering over the receiver's actions, contrary to the impression conveyed by Crawford and Sobel's seminal work on cheap talk.
Journal of Economic TheoryEfficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
22 Citations1991Thomas R. Palfrey, Sanjay Srivastava
This paper identifies a class of simple mechanisms which are immune to pre-play communication and shows that any incentive efficient allocation can be uniquely implemented by such a mechanism.
DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)Cheap talk, neologisms, and bargaining
4 Citations1988Joseph Farrell, Robert Gibbons
The Caltech Institute Archives (California Institute of Technology)Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-Play Communication
2 Citations1989Thomas R. Palfrey, Sanjay Srivastava