Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
The Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationPublished 1 January 1988
Oliver Hart
Citations646
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score1.42
SNIP1.45
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Abstract
Journal Article Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm Get access OLIVER D. HART OLIVER D. HART Massachusetts Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Volume 4, Issue 1, SPRING 1988, Pages 119–139, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036940 Published: 01 March 1988
Keywords
Social SciencesDecision SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
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