User Fees and Equity Issues in Public Hunting Expenditures: The Case of Ring-Necked Pheasant in Oregon
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Abstract
Declining real budgets for wildlife agencies are focusing attention on the potential for user fees to supply specific services. While Hemingway's statement may suggest the intensity of interest by some participants, few would believe that such sentiments reflect average willingness to pay. Valuation studies are therefore useful to assess both the likelihood of success of a fee system as well as equity consequences of fee structures. With such information, policy makers can compare likely revenues from user fees with the cost of supplying specific wildlife enhancement programs (Matulich, Workman and Jubenville 1987). Valuation information also enables policy makers to more fully understand attendant welfare effects. While use of nonmarket valuation procedures in this context is limited, some studies have assessed the impact of user fees for specific public goods (e.g., Huszar and Seckler 1974). The overall purpose of this study is to investigate economic aspects of implementing user fees for a public, game enhancement program for ring-necked pheasants in Oregon. The analysis is based on a closedform contingent valuation survey of hunters during the 1986 western Oregon pheasant season. Econometric estimates of a logit model are then used to estimate (1) willingness to pay for the existing program; (2) participation rates, revenue, and willingness to pay for programs with varying user fees, including a simple Ramsey price system; and (3) the distribution of these variables among income classes.
