Reply to Schulkin

Abstract

Jay Schulkin 1 Schulkin J. Theory of mind and mirroring neurons. Trends Cognit. Sci. 2000; 4: 252-254 Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (1) Google Scholar has several reservations about simulation theory (ST) as an account of mind-reading; we have reservations about his reservations. Schulkin classifies ST as a modern variant of the argument from analogy (for other minds), but thinks this argument has long been refuted. Several comments are in order. First, not all simulation theorists construe the theory as a form of the argument from analogy 2 Gordon R. Simulation without introspection or inference from me to you. in: Davies M. Stone T. Mental Simulation. Blackwell, 1995: 53—67 Google Scholar . However, in our view, the resemblance is close enough to merit discussion 3 Goldman A. Interpretation psychologized. Mind Lang. 1989; 4: 161-185 Crossref Scopus (353) Google Scholar . We do not agree that traditional criticisms of the analogical argument render it hopeless for cognitive science. The chief philosophical criticism of it, in fact, concerns an epistemological question: could anyone be justified in believing in the mental states of others solely on the basis of their own mental states? This would be an induction from a single case, a very problematic induction. Whatever one's conclusion about this epistemological issue, it does not concern the cognitive science of mind-reading. Cognitive science is interested in the processes by which children and adults actually arrive at third-person mental-state attributions, whether or not these processes yield 'justified' beliefs. The evidential warrant for interpreters' attributions is beside the point, because there is no guarantee that the basic cognitive mechanisms nature has put in place use evidentially impeccable inferences.