A Pragmatic Method for Evaluating Election Schemes through Simulation
American Political Science ReviewPublished 1 March 1983
Robert F. Bordley
Citations44
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score5.53
SNIP4.76
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TL;DR
A simulation method is developed for assessing the desirability of different voting schemes in different situations and finds that approval voting seems to be a good voting scheme for mass elections.
Abstract
This article combines ideas from ethics, social choice, and political theory to develop a simulation method for assessing the desirability of different voting schemes in different situations. I use the method to evaluate six well-known election systems. My results are intuitive. I find that approval voting seems to be a good voting scheme for mass elections.
Keywords
Social SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
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