An Ancient Struggle: A Game Theory Approach to Resolving the Nile Conflict

Abstract

The Nile River has been the center of water resources development tensions among four main riparian actors: Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and other upstream nations. Each player has a desire to meet its national demands under increasingly stressed limited resources. Egypt, the most powerful of the actors, strives to maintain the status quo: securing the water supply that is barely sufficient for its growing population. Sudan is wedged between its 1959 treaty with Egypt and potentially economically beneficial cooperation with Ethiopia. Ethiopia, the source of most of the Nile, strives to increase its water share to secure its food supply and facilitate economic development. Finally, the upstream nations seek to be released from the water development restrictions placed on them by the current system. All nations fear retaliation from Egypt. This study applies game theoretic methods to study this interstate water problem using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution, which provides insights into the strategic behaviors of the conflicting parties. The developed model attempts to determine most likely outcomes of the conflict given the nations options and preferences. Results indicate that the current situation is not stable and that stable outcomes include retaliation by Egypt. A sensitivity analysis shows that the model is highly sensitive to Egypt's preferences, however, but not very sensitive to Sudan's or Ethiopia's preferences.