Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model
The Economic JournalPublished 1 December 1990
Michael Suk‐Young Chwe
Citations97
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score5.37
SNIP2.83
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Abstract
Journal Article Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model Get access Michael Suk-Young Chwe Michael Suk-Young Chwe Northwestern University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 100, Issue 403, 1 December 1990, Pages 1109–1121, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233961 Published: 01 December 1990
Keywords
Decision SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
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