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Separation of Powers and Political Accountability

The Quarterly Journal of EconomicsPublished 1 November 1997
Tomas Persson, Gérard Roland, Guido Tabellini
Citations1,213
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score35.99
SNIP9.32

Abstract

Political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials, but they are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power, but only with appropriate checks and balances. Checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature, yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy. In this way, the two bodies discipline each other to the voters' advantage. Under appropriate checks and balances, separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information.

Keywords

Social SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance