Economic concentration and corporate political behavior: A cross-industry comparison

Abstract

Abstract Several political sociologists have argued that the trend toward economic concentration in major industries in advanced capitalist societies has led to a growth in corporate political power. Most of these arguments are based on the notion that economic concentration facilitates the mobilization of industries as cohesive politica actors. This paper presents an empirical examination of this argument. The similarity of campaign contributions in the 1980 Congressional elections by the four largest members of 25 industries is employed as the dependent variable. Concentration ratios within the industries, sizes and geographical proximities of the firms, and measures of within-industry economic and social integration are employed as independent and intervening variables. Employing a spatial autocorrelation model to correct for nonindependence among observations, we find that although concentration and similarity of political behavior are positively associated in a bivariate correlation, the relation disappears when controls are introduced. Common stock ownership by the same institutions and indirect director interlocks through financial institutions are significant predictors of behavioral similarity.