A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules
Journal of Economic Dynamics and ControlPublished 5 July 2007
Jens Josephson
Citations27
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score1.71
SNIP1.24
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Abstract
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Keywords
Social SciencesDecision Sciences
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