Explanation, Invariance, and Intervention
Philosophy of SciencePublished 1 January 1997
Jim Woodward
Citations155
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score0.69
SNIP0.82
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Abstract
This paper defends a counterfactual account of explanation, according to which successful explanation requires tracing patterns of counterfactual dependence of a special sort, involving what I call active counterfactuals. Explanations having this feature must appeal to generalizations that are invariant—stable under certain sorts of changes. These ideas are illustrated by examples drawn from physics and econometrics.
Keywords
Computer ScienceDecision SciencesArts and Humanities
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