Conflict and Cooperation in Managing International Water Resources Such as the Great Lakes

This paper uses game theory to assess the potential for cooperative management of an international water body such as the Great Lakes and demonstrates that a noncooperative solution is not the inevitable outcome for the use of an open access water resource.

Abstract

Growing concerns about the avail- ability of clean water supplies have stimulated in- creased interest in the management of interna- tional waters. This paper uses game theory to assess the potential for cooperative management of an international water body such as the Great Lakes. We demonstrate that a noncooperative so- lution is not the inevitable outcome for the use of an open access water resource. Stable coopera- tive coalitions are possible when a subset of users decides to cooperate. In our examples, once a minimum number of users decides to cooperate, the remaining noncooperators find that it is in their best interests to cooperate. (JEL Q25)