Theories of the state and the state of accounting: Economic reductionism and political voluntarism in accounting regulation theory
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Abstract
It has recently been suggested that the inability of the economics-finance literature to say anything definitive about the appropriate form of accounting regulation highlights the need to augment neoclassical economic analysis with sociopolitical considerations. It is argued in this paper that patching up the orthodox theory would be futile; that the flaws are so fundamental as to warrant abandoning neoclassical state theory and embarking on a serious debate about radical theoretical alternatives. Economic reductionism and political voluntarism are shown to be the main flaws in the neoclassical theory, and these deficiencies are primarily responsible for the present theoretical disarray. After a brief overview of radical theories of the state, this paper suggests that replacing—not refurbishing—neoclassical state theory is the most plausible strategy for accounting researchers.
