Non-Existence of Single-Wage Equilibria in Search Models with Adverse Selection
The Review of Economic StudiesPublished 1 July 1992
James Albrecht, Susan Vroman
Citations14
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score19.17
SNIP5.27
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Abstract
This paper examines the problem of non-existence of a single-wage equilibrium in a simple search model with asymmetric information. A pure-strategy, symmetric Nash equilibrium fails to exist because adverse selection arising from steady-state considerations causes a non-concavity in the payoff function.
Keywords
Decision SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and FinanceBusiness, Management and Accounting
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