A Revision of thè Concept of Ethical Appeal

Abstract

synthesis of distinctions. It is my judgment of the rhetorical scene that these distinctions hâve been too long ignored. Traditionally in rhetoric there has been a mix-up between the concepts oiethos and ethical appeal. This mix-up, as Thomas E. Corts suggests, may even hâve been originally etymological.1 There appears in interpretations of classical rhetoric an assimilation of €0oc, meaning only custom or habit, and the word ήθος, meaning custom, disposition, character, delineation of character, or hearing. And it was ή0ος, meaning character, that Aristotle and subsequent writers used to designate arti st ic appeals as part of the triad that includes pathos and logos. But mix-up or not, it is the morally neutral concept €0oc that seems to interest rhetorical scholars and theorists most today. This, I believe, limits our generai understanding of rhetorical e vents. It is Corts' judgment that scholars should, in interpreting classical rhetoric, emphasize the positive moral quality of ήθος, rather than the behavioral neutrality of its sister term which is to ancient rhetoric.2 Although we may dispute his not vital interpretation, there has been and continues to be a mix-up between ethos and ethics in discussions of ethical appeal. Not only has ethos become a morally neutral term in contemporary studies, but the concepts oiethos and ethical appeal hâve been assimilated. The consequence of this reduction is that important differences and distinctions among moral, immoral, and non-moral appeals are altogether ignored in discussions of ethical appeal.