A lemons market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third party logistics providers
European Journal of Operational ResearchPublished 1 September 2000Open access
Wei Shi Lim
Citations82
SJR quartileQ4
SJR score0.11
SNIP0.06
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TL;DR
A game-theoretic model is developed that studies the contract design problem of a third party logistics buyer when he is faced with aThird party logistics provider and the quality of service and the cost of providing the service are private information to the latter.
Abstract
10.1016/S0377-2217(99)00210-6
Keywords
Decision SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
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