Incremental Budgeting and International Organizations

Abstract

The research reported in this article falls within the tradition of both the behavioral budgetary and international organization literature. The article involves two extensions of the ongoing inquiry into the politics of the budgetary process. First, it examines incremental budgetary theory in a new political arena, the international governmental organization. Specifically, budgetary actions between 1951 and 1969 regarding the budget total in the United Nations, World Health Organization, and International Labor Organization are analyzed. Second, the study expands the number of steps in the budgetary process which are included in the incremental model. In addition to original budget requests aiid legislative actions, supplementary budget changes and actual expenditures are analyzed. The empirical results of the study support the incremental model of budgeting. The relevance for the international organization field lies in the application of quantitative research techniques to a new subject, budget making in international governmental organizations, and in the development of a new theoretical statement, in the form of a structural equation model, about political behavior in international organizations.