Communication networks and collective action
Generate an AI Snapshot to get a quick, structured summary of this paper.
A concise AI-generated summary of the paper will appear here once you click Generate AI Snapshot.
TL;DR
It is shown that there is a curvilinear relationship between the centralization of a network and its vulnerability to this type of conflict; highly centralized and highly decentralized networks are the least vulnerable.
Abstract
When individuals in a group have incentives to hoard information, the group may be less effective in achieving its goals. Mixed motives both to communicate and accumulate information create a "social dilemma" in which group and individual goals are in conflict. The results of a series of computer simulations are described in which it is shown that there is a curvilinear relationship between the centralization of a network and its vulnerability to this type of conflict; highly centralized and highly decentralized networks are the least vulnerable.