A note on overemployment/underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information
Economics LettersPublished 1 January 1983
Russell Cooper
Citations49
SJR quartileQ2
SJR score0.76
SNIP0.98
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Abstract
Models of labor contracts under asymmetric information may predict either overemployment or underemployment. This paper shows that this result depends crucially on whether or not leisure is a normal good if firms are risk neutral.
Keywords
Decision SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
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