Outlines of a theory of emotions as metarepresentational states of mind
Published 1 January 1998
Rainer Reisenzein
Citations7
Generate an AI Snapshot to get a quick, structured summary of this paper.
Study Snapshot
ObjectiveStudy objective
MethodsResearch methodology
PopulationPopulation studied
Sample sizeSample sizes
OutcomesStudy outcomes here
ResultsStudy results comes here
LimitationsResearch study limitations comes here
A concise AI-generated summary of the paper will appear here once you click Generate AI Snapshot.
Abstract
This paper summarizes a theory of emotions as metarepresentational states of mind (for more detail, see Reisenzein, 1998). The basic idea of the theory is that at least a core set of human emotions including surprise are nonconceptual products of hardwired, metarepresentational mechanisms whose main function is to subserve the monitoring and updating of the two basic forms of propositional representations, beliefs and desires.
Keywords
Psychology
Cognition & EmotionTowards a Cognitive Theory of Emotions
1,733 Citations1987Keith Oatley, P. N. Johnson‐Laird
The American Journal of PsychologyPsychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind
1,053 Citations1989John Barresi, Jerry A. Fodor
Journal of Personality and Social PsychologyPleasure-arousal theory and the intensity of emotions.
389 Citations1994Ranier Reisenzein
Personality and Social Psychology ReviewUntangling the Appraisal-Emotion Connection
188 Citations1997Brian Parkinson
It is argued that future progress in this research area requires tighter specification of the different kinds of appraisal process that operate during real-time emotional episodes and of their potential interactions with other aspects of the unfolding emotional syndrome.
American PsychologistStumpf's cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion.
55 Citations1992Rainer Reisenzein, Wolfgang Schönpflug
It is suggested that Stumpf's version of a cognitive-evaluative theory of emotion deserves the serious attention of contemporary investigators and that several of his objections to noncognitive theories of emotion retain their force against modern versions of these theories.