Default Probability
Cognitive SciencePublished 1 April 1991Open access
Daniel N. Osherson, Joshua Stern, Ormond Wilkie, Michael Stob, Edward E. Smith
Citations98
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Abstract
A probability may be called “default” if it is neither derived from preestablished probabilities nor based on considerations of frequency or symmetry. Default probabilities presumably arise through reasoning based on causality and similarity. This article advances a model of default probability based on a featural approach to similarity. The accuracy of the model is assessed by comparing its predictions to the probabilities provided by undergraduates asked to reason about mammals.
Keywords
PsychologySocial SciencesArts and Humanities
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