Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts
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TL;DR
This work studies the length of agreements in a market in which infinitely-lived firms contract with agents that live for two periods, and relates the results to the optimal assignment literature that follows Becker (1973).
Abstract
We are grateful to the participants at seminars at CREST (Paris), U de Salamanca and U Autònoma de Barcelona and at SAE 2011 (Málaga), 20iDEA 2011 (Barcelona), Games 2012 (Istanbul), CICGTA 2012 (Qingdao), SAET 2013 (Paris), as well as four reviewers and the co-editor for their insightful comments. Financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (ECO2008-04321, ECO2009-07616 and ECO2012-31962), Generalitat de Catalunya (2009SGR-169), Junta de Andalucía (SEJ-02936 and SEJ-04992), Severo Ochoa Programme (SEV2011-0075), and ICREA Academia is gratefully acknowledged