The Illusion of Morality as Self-Interest: A Reason to Cooperate in Social Dilemmas
Psychological SciencePublished 1 July 1997
Jonathan Baron
Citations57
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score2.50
SNIP2.29
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Abstract
One reason for people's voluntary cooperation in social dilemmas, or altruistic behavior in general, may be their belief that altruism pays off in terms of long-run self-interest Although this is often true, it is typically false in large-scale social dilemmas among strangers In three questionnaire studies, subjects endorsed this self-interest illusion frequently for large-scale dilemmas, such as overfishing and pollution, in which the benefits of cooperation are delayed.
Keywords
Social SciencesDecision Sciences
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