How children tell a lie from a joke: The role of second‐order mental state attributions

Abstract

The relationship between the ability to attribute second‐order mental states and the ability to tell a joke from a lie was examined. Forty‐eight children (mean age 6.8) were tested for their ability to make both second‐order ignorance and belief attributions, and to discriminate lies from jokes. Children typically were able to distinguish a lie from a joke only after they could attribute second‐order ignorance (Person 1 does not know what Person 2 knows). In contrast, children could distinguish a lie from a joke before they could attribute second‐order false belief (Person 1 wrongly thinks that Person 2 thinks x). The presence of intonation distinguishing the joke from the lie had no effect on children's ability to determine that the joke was not intended as a lie. These results provide evidence for a relation between a selective aspect of the child's theory of mind (the ability to conceptualize second‐order ignorance) and the child's ability to interpret and distinguish two kinds of intentionally false utterances.