Misconceptions or P-Prims: How May Alternative Perspectives of Cognitive Structure Influence Instructional Perceptions and Intentions

Abstract

Abstract The notion that students come to science courses with misconceptions has become quite widely accepted by those who follow or participate in education research. DiSessa and his colleagues (diSessa, 1988, 1993; Smith, diSessa, & Roschelle, 1993/1994) have challenged the theoretical and empirical validity of this perspective and offered an alternative account of cognitive structure in phenomenological primitives or p-prims. The purpose of this article is to further clarify and contrast the two accounts: in particular, to consider their utility and generativity as conceptual tools for teachers. How may each perspective influence instructional perceptions and intentions? The article recounts a discussion about forces and motion from a high-school physics class, analyzes how a teacher may perceive students' participation in that discussion from either perspective, and considers what, based on those perceptions, the teacher may see as tasks for instruction.