Implications of Conversion and Magnitude of Cognitive Dissonance
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Abstract
FOR those experiencing it, religious conversion is frequently so rich and unique as to defy adequate description. Without the least disparagement of ineffableness, divine grace, or explosion of subliminal (James, 1903, p. 237), it is possible to take a somewhat pedestrian view of conversion that may make significant aspects of the process amenable to experimental analysis. The aspect focused upon in the present report is favorable change in attitude toward an alien religion, a religion that is not one's own. It was assumed that such change is central to all conversion, to all shifts in religious affiliation, and this change in attitude was the dependent variable. Two factors thought to affect the amount of such change were studied: 1) the implications a person sees for himself if he were to adopt the alien religion; 2) the amount of attitude change pressure brought to bear on him. With respect to the first, a person may examine the implications for himself of giving up his present religious affiliation (or lack of one) to adopt another. These implications may concern changes in his habitual behavior or changes in his thinking and beliefs. Although both kinds of change would usually accompany religious conversion it was possible to discriminate between persons emphasizing either behavioral or implications. The second factor was the amount of pressure brought to bear upon a person to adopt a more favorable attitude toward the alien religion. A recent theory by Festinger (1957) attempts to state the conditions under which discrepancies between cognitions produce cognitive dissonance, a state of tension that motivates the individual to reduce or eliminate the discrepancies. Festinger's theory has implications for attitude change under conditions of forced compliance, that is, where a person carries out behavior contrary to his prior opinion. Experiments on forced compliance show that the greater the force supporting compliance to such discrepant behavior, the less the dissonance and consequent attitude change toward the initially disliked position (e.g., Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Cohen, Brehm, & Fleming, 1958). Three recent studies (Brehm & Cohen, 1959; Cohen, Terry, & Jones, 1959; Davis & Jones, 1960) have shown that dissonance decreases with decrease in feelings of personal volition (i.e., increase in force to comply). Consequently, more attitude change pressure would be expected where individuals experience a high rather than a low degree of subjective choice in engaging in behavior contrary to their prior opinions. To summarize, high and low amounts of attitude change pressure were brought to bear on two types of persons-those seeing mainly behavioral consequences and those seeing mainly consequences from their adoption of an alien religion. The effects of these factors on
