Self-serving bias in the attribution of responsibility: Cognitive versus motivational explanations

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to compare the cognitive and motivational explanations of differences in the responsibility assigned to the victim of a crime. It has generally been found that the victim of a crime is assigned more responsibility for that crime by similar others if its consequences are severe. The motivational explanation for this finding is that subjects are threatened by the idea that a serious crime can happen by chance. The cognitive explanation is that serious crimes are rarer and subjects attribute more of the responsibility for rarer events to those who experience them. This study tested these two explanations by independently varying the severity and the likelihood of a crime and examining attributions of responsibility to its victim. The results of the study support the cognitive explanation. Similar others were found to attribute more responsibility for a crime to the victim when that crime was presented as rare, irrespective of whether its consequences were mild or severe. In addition, when likelihood was controlled experimentally no effect of severity upon attributions of responsibility was found. These results suggest that, within the context of attributions of responsibility to victims, patterns of attribution consistent with those predicted by theories suggesting motivational influences upon attribution may actually represent the operation of cognitive processes.