The effects of constituent trust and representative bargaining visibility on intergroup bargaining

Abstract

In this study of the intergroup bargaining process, the effects of a constituent's trust in his representative and the visibility of the representative's bargaining upon: (a) the representative's bargaining behavior, (b) the opposing representative's (outsider's) bargaining behavior, and (c) the number of agreements reached by the representative and outsider were investigated. Subjects formed two-man labor and management teams and bargained over four separate wages. In the negotiations, two subjects serving as their respective team's representative bargained face to face with each other; each representative's constituent directed his bargaining. Initial constituent distrust (vs trust) fostered competitive representative and outsider bargaining and fewer agreements. Bargaining visibility engendered similar though weaker results. In addition, as the negotiations proceeded, the initial constituent distrust of his representative diminished as the representative's competitiveness increased. The above findings suggest a modification of current intergroup bargaining models.