A Temporal Logic for Reasoning about Processes and Plans*

Cognitive SciencePublished 1 April 1982

Drew McDermott

DOI10.1207/s15516709cog0602_1

Source URL

Citations493

SJR quartileQ1

SJR score1.13

SNIP1.32

TL;DR

A first-order temporal logic, in which it is possible to name and prove things about facts, events, plans, and world histories, and provides analyses of causality, continuous change in quantities, the persistence of facts, and the relationship between tasks and actions.

Abstract

Much previous work in artificial intelligence has neglected representing time in all its complexity. In particular, it has neglected continuous change and the indeterminacy of the future. To rectify this, I have developed a first‐order temporal logic, in which it is possible to name and prove things about facts, events, plans, and world histories. In particular, the logic provides analyses of causality, continuous change in quantities, the persistence of facts (the frame problem), and the relationship between tasks and actions. It may be possible to implement a temporal‐inference machine based on this logic, which keeps track of several “maps” of a time line, one per possible history.

Keywords

Computer Science

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