It pays to do good, but not to do more good than it pays
Journal of Economic Behavior & OrganizationPublished 1 September 1981
Ronald Wintrobe
Citations28
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score1.44
SNIP1.31
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Abstract
Recently Becker and Hirshleifer have attempted to explain the survival of altruism. Altruism ‘pays’ in their framework because it permits mutual cooperation or exchange to take place. This paper shows that these arguments are invalid. This case is that in any environment where altruism pays there is always an egoistic strategy called cooperation egoism — which yields an even higher return. In equilibrium, this will be anticipated so that, while altruism may pay off in a disequilibrium situation, in equilibrium egoism and not altruism has survival value.
Keywords
Social Sciences
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