Judicial Modification of Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach
The Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationPublished 1 October 1993
Benjamin E. Hermalin, Michael L. Katz
Citations170
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score1.42
SNIP1.45
Generate an AI Snapshot to get a quick, structured summary of this paper.
Study Snapshot
ObjectiveStudy objective
MethodsResearch methodology
PopulationPopulation studied
Sample sizeSample sizes
OutcomesStudy outcomes here
ResultsStudy results comes here
LimitationsResearch study limitations comes here
A concise AI-generated summary of the paper will appear here once you click Generate AI Snapshot.
Abstract
Benjamin E. Hermalin, Michael L. Katz; Judicial Modification of Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and T
Keywords
Social SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
Journal of Political EconomyThe Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
9,389 Citations1986Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver Hart
The Journal of FinanceINFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
4,083 Citations1977Richard A. Brealey, Hayne E. Leland +1 more
The Quarterly Journal of EconomicsSignaling Games and Stable Equilibria
3,333 Citations1987In‐Koo Cho, David M. Kreps
The Bell Journal of EconomicsRisk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
1,292 Citations1979Steven Shavell
American Economic ReviewContracts as a barrier to entry
782 Citations1987Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton
The Yale Law JournalFilling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules
604 Citations1989Ian Ayres, Robert Gertner
Journal of Economic TheoryStrategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
364 Citations1990In-Koo Cho, Joel Sobel
The Review of Economic StudiesIncomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
300 Citations1991Tai-Yeong Chung
EconometricaMoral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
258 Citations1991Benjamin E. Hermalin, Michael L. Katz
The Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationLegal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency
209 Citations1990Philippe Aghion, Benjamin E. Hermalin
The RAND Journal of EconomicsEfficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract
206 Citations1984William P. Rogerson
Columbia Law ReviewLiquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach
204 Citations1977Charles J. Goetz, Robert E. Scott
Journal of Economic TheoryCommunication between rational agents
174 Citations1990Matthew Rabin
A solution concept which does guarantee communication in some games is defined, and an equilibrium version of the concept is defined and proved, and examples where its predictions seem more natural than Farrell's neologism-proof equilibrium are presented.
The RAND Journal of EconomicsResolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements
154 Citations1991Joel S. Demski, David E. M. Sappington
Economic TheoryMeasurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts
114 Citations1992Franklin Allen, Douglas Gale
AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA)Noncooperative Models of Bargaining
107 Citations1990Ken Binmore, Martin J. Osborne +4 more
Toulouse 1 Capitole Publications (Université Toulouse I Capitole)Renegotiation design with unverifiable information
79 Citations1994Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont +1 more
The Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationOn the Social Optimality of Liquidated Damage Clauses: An Economic Analysis
78 Citations1992Tai-Yeong Chung
European Economic ReviewContract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information∗
67 Citations1990Mathias Dewatripont, Eric Maskin
The Review of Economic StudiesUncertainty, Asymmetric Information and Bilateral Contracts
48 Citations1984Michael Riordan
The RAND Journal of EconomicsEfficient Contracting with Reliance and a Damage Measure
35 Citations1986Akira Konakayama, Toshihide Mitsui +1 more
DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)Three essays on the theory of contracts
4 Citations1988Benjamin E. Hermalin