Optimal deterrents to malingering : the role of incentives, attitudes and information costs in social insurance, especially sickness benefit and welfare
Published 1 January 1991
Kari Lantto
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Abstract
In a sequence of four models which all generalize the single-period model of Diamond and Mirrlees (1978), we explain and optimize the structure of static social insurance against health-related dis ...
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Social SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and FinanceHealth Professions