Institutionalism: On the Need to Firm up Notions of Social Structure and the Human Subject

Abstract

Within (old) institutionalist theorizing there has been a widespread tendency for institutions and technology to be treated in a somewhat dichotomous fashion, with the former regarded as synonymous with constraint, rigidity, or stasis and the latter associated with change and dynamics. Very often this dichotomy is associated with Thorstein (being referred to as the Veblen dichotomy) even though on close scrutiny of Veblen's texts it is easy enough to find commentaries seemingly at odds with it. Reliance upon the dichotomy in question has been most apparent within the dominant North American strand of institutionalist thinking, with some contributors even prepared to argue that it constitutes the tradition's central analytic tool or defining core (see, e.g., Waller 1982; Munkirs 1988; Klein and Miller 1996). However, not all institutionalists have accepted the dichotomy as formulated, even within the North American movement. Indeed in recent years, especially,l there appears to be a significant amount of dissent within this grouping (see, e.g., Ramstad 1995; Wisman and Smith 1999) as well as endeavor to reformulate aspects of the dichotomy (see, e.g., Tool 1979; Miller 1992; Bush 1987, 1989; Waller 1987; Dugger 1995). I think it is fair to say, though, that most dissenters and reformers have rested content largely with identifying substantive limitations of the dichotomy as traditionally formulated or else with questioning the legitimacy of associating it with Veblen. Rather less effort, it seems to me, has been directed to explaining the widespread acceptance of the dichotomy within the institutionalist tradition or for the commonplace association of it with Veblen. Here I want to focus on these latter two issues in particular, starting with the question of why the dichotomy has emerged and been as widely accepted as it has. I believe