Extinction of Conservation: A Methodological and Theoretical Analysis.

Abstract

A recent exchange in the Merrill-Palmer Quarterly (Hall & Simpson, 1968; Smedslund, 1968) was directed to the question of whether the Piagetian concept of conservation is subject to experimental extinction. Hall and Simpson argued that conservation can be extinguished, drawing on the results of several extinction studies of their own. They proposed a learning explanation for the development and extinction of conservation. Smedslund replied that conservation can never be extinguished, stating that a defining property of true conservation is that it is logically necessary and therefore unextinguishable. His position was derived from the equilibration model of Piaget. Thus, in this exchange an important theoretical question was raised: Is conservation an empirically learned and therefore extinguishable response (Hall & Simpson), or is it rather a logically necessary product of the de velopment of concrete operations (Smedslund-Piaget)? The purpose of the present paper is to clarify some of the issues involved in the Hall and Simpson-Smedslund debate and in the general question of whether cognitive beliefs can be extinguished. To this end, results from the handful of existing extinction studies will be briefly reviewed. The main emphasis, however, will be on a critical analysis of the methodological and conceptual problems present in extinction research.