A Teleological Critique of Modern Cognitivism

A teleological critique of modern cognitivism is summarized in terms of four points that address the suitability of such mechanistic accounts to explain human cognition.

Abstract

This paper summarizes a teleological critique of modern cognitivism in terms of four points that address the suitability of such mechanistic accounts to explain human cognition: (1) Final-cause formulations are not required to understand mechanical processing, whereas human reasoning cannot be understood without them. (2) Computer theory is exclusively extraspective, but human reasoning demands an introspective theoretical account. (3) A mechanical process is limited to mediation, whereas human beings employ a predication process in their reasoning. (4) Human beings employ oppositionality, enabling them to reason according to a soft disjunction, whereas machines follow a Boolean logic that limits them to a hard disjunction in which only apposition is at play. Research reputed to be dealing with key criticisms of this paper is examined and found wanting. The author's research in support of predicational modeling is cited.