THE RELATION OF MORAL JUDGMENT STAGE DISPARITY TO DEVELOPMENTAL EFFECTS OF PEER DIALOGUES

Abstract

Kohlberg (1969, 1976) has described moral judgment as de veloping through a universal invariant sequence of qualitatively dif ferent stages, with each subsequent one subsuming the less differ entiated and less integrated prior one. In recent years, experimental studies using diverse methods have generally found a positive rela tion between confrontation with higher-stage moral arguments and upward change in moral judgment, as well as between participation in moral discussions and upward change in moral judgment. One of the earliest studies (Turiel, 1966) concluded that more learning results from exposure to the stage directly above the sub ject's own (the + 1 condition) than from exposure to the stage two above or one below (cf. critical interpretations by Broughton, 1978; Kurtines & Greif, 1974; Turiel, 1972). Comparable results have been reported by Cowan, Langer, Heavenrich and Nathanson (1969) and, to a limited degree, by Tracy and Cross (1973). Keasey (1973) found a similar immediate effect that washed out, however, in a two week delayed posttest. In these studies, the treatment manipulation involved prepared inputs, and was accomplished through direct and active participation of an experimenter or accomplice. Although the internal validity of such studies is well established,