Game Theory and Communication

Abstract

Abstract Communication is said to occur when the acts or cues given by one individual influence the behavior of another (Wiley 1983, Endler 1993). Traits that are specialized for the purpose of communication, which I will refer to as signals or displays, include some of the most striking products of natural selection: Consider the elaborate struc tures erected by male bower-birds to attract mates, the lengthy and complex songs of whales, or the brilliant colors of venomous coral snakes. These traits, and others like them, are the product of signaler/receiver coevolution. Selection favors signalers that elicit favorable responses from receivers; it also favors receivers that react appropri-ately to signalers. Game theory, with its emphasis on strategic interaction, is thus a useful tool with which to analyze the evolution of communicative behavior, and biologists have made extensive use of it. Most interactions between animals involve some kind of communication: For example, offspring may solicit food from their parents, opponents threaten each other during conflict, prey attempt to deter a predator or warn others of its presence, males display to attract females, and so on. Consequently, a large number of different game theoretic models have been developed, each concerned with just one form of communication.