Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and Cooperation
The Journal of Law Economics and OrganizationPublished 1 January 1990
Jonathan Bendor, Dilip Mookherjee
Citations108
SJR quartileQ1
SJR score1.42
SNIP1.45
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Abstract
JONATHAN BENDOR, DILIP MOOKHERJEE; Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and Cooperation, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Volume 6, Issue 1, 1 Mar
Keywords
Social SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
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