When Are Nash Equilibria Independent of the Distribution of Agents' Characteristics?
The Review of Economic StudiesPublished 1 October 1985Open access
Théodore C. Bergstrom, Hal R. Varian
Citations168
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Abstract
We present some examples of Nash equilibria that are independent of the distribution of some parameter across the economic agents and describe a general theorem that characterizes this phenomenon.
Keywords
Decision SciencesEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
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